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“FOR THE UNITED STATES”:
GOVERNMENT LAWYERS IN COURT
PATRICIA M. WALD*
I
INTRODUCTION
It is a rare attorney practicing in the federal courts who does not encounter
1
government lawyers on a regular basis. Those of us on the bench—particularly
those of us in the D.C. Circuit—have had many opportunities to become familiar with government lawyers. In my nineteen-plus years as a federal appellate judge, I have engaged with hundreds—perhaps thousands—of government
lawyers as they argue their way through the approximately eighty-three percent
2
of our docket in which the federal government is a party. Before becoming a
judge, I did two stints in the Department of Justice (“DOJ”), the second time
as an Assistant Attorney General for Legislative Affairs. Although I functioned in that job primarily as a legislative advocate for DOJ before Congress, I
often discussed the Department’s positions on pending bills with lawyers both
within DOJ and within other departments and independent agencies. In my
private practice, I worked both alongside and in opposition to government attorneys. Like eight of my ten colleagues on the D.C. Circuit, I have “been
there,” and from my “here now” vantage point as a judge, I propose to set
down, largely impressionistically, some of my observations and reactions to
government lawyering in court.
II
THE GOVERNMENT LAWYER AND THE COURT
In the tripartite system of government our Constitution establishes, the relationship between judges and government lawyers is, ideally, conducted at
arm’s length. In a very basic sense, we are part of the same government, but
our residence in two separate branches is designed, in part, to ensure that the
courts function as the bulwark of citizens’ liberties, standing fast against a poCopyright © 1998 by Law and Contemporary Problems
This essay is also available at http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/61LCPWald.
* Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit; Chief Judge, 19861991. Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legislative Affairs, Department of Justice, 1977-79.
The author would like to thank her law clerk Laura Heymann, J.D. 1997, University of California
at Berkeley School of Law (Boalt Hall), for her assistance on this essay.
1. By “government lawyer,” I am referring to lawyers who represent the federal, rather than a
state, government.
2. See UNITED STATES COURTS, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT, 1995 ANNUAL REPORT 41.
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tentially tyrannical or overbearing government eager to encroach on citizens’
legal rights. Indeed, one of the distinctive aspects of our American system of
justice that reformers seek to export abroad is the court’s independence not
only from the executive and legislative branches in general but more specifically from the prosecutor who brings cases to the court on behalf of the state.
In Eastern Europe, where I have worked over the past seven years with newly
emerging democracies intent on making their judges “independent” protectors
of human rights and constitutional integrity, one of the most vexing dilemmas
facing reformers is how to convert the formerly all-powerful Procurator
(prosecutor) into just another lawyer. Under prior socialist regimes, the Procurator was part of the court system: He sat on the bench, robed, alongside the
judges and had extensive powers to arrest, detain, and interrogate those suspected of violating the criminal law. During his investigations he consulted
with the judges ex parte. In these countries, including Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria, he was by far the most powerful and prestigious person in the
courtroom, and his strong party connections made him the one to see for results, or, perhaps, for mercy. His powers were equally extensive in the civil
courts, where he could intervene in suits between private parties as the
3
“protector of the law.” In light of the systems that existed in these countries, it
is a significant achievement that American judges must treat government law4
yers like anyone else in the courtroom.
Yet our American model of complete independence is often belied by the
reality of daily experience. Not only do we see government lawyers generally,
and many individual ones as well, far more often in court than we see private
lawyers, but also a disproportionate number of federal judges have been drawn
from the ranks of government lawyers. Eight of our eleven active D.C. Circuit
appeals judges, for example, have been DOJ lawyers or Assistant U.S. Attorneys at one time or another in their careers. This statistic can, of course, cut
both ways: While DOJ or agency alumni may have a special understanding of
how policy positions are formulated and litigating strategies are adopted within
the government, they will also feel more at liberty to second-guess those decisions. Witness, for example, a recent statement by one of our judges, who reluctantly concurred in the court’s decision to uphold a criminal conviction: “As
a Justice Department alumnus, I simply cannot imagine approving, had it come
5
to me, the prosecution of Bryant, who seems to be an unfortunate scapegoat.”
3. See HAROLD J. BERMAN, JUSTICE IN THE U.S.S.R. 238 (1963); Stephen C. Thaman, Reform of
the Procuracy and Bar in Russia, 3 PARKER SCH. J. E. EUR. L. 1 (1996).
4. See, e.g., JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED
STATES JUDGES Canon 3A(4) (1997) (instructing federal judges neither to “initiate nor consider ex
parte communications . . . [concerning] a pending or impending proceeding”).
5. United States v. Bryant, 117 F.3d 1464, 1472 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (Silberman, J., concurring), cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct. 1510 (1998); see also Summers v. Department of Justice, 140 F.3d 1077, 1084 (D.C.
Cir. 1998) (Silberman, J., concurring) (“I find myself in a rather strange situation in this case because,
unlike the district judge, I have in a sense reviewed Hoover’s official and confidential files ‘in camera,’
but did so almost 25 years ago as the Deputy Attorney General (and Acting Attorney General) of the
United States.”).
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In my own case, a stint as DOJ’s legislative liaison taught me that the policy rationales offered as the government’s position by a “mission-oriented” agency
may differ from the ones that would result if the White House and Office of
Management and Budget ("OMB") were consulted—a lesson that resonates
6
from time to time in my judicial work. Familiarity may not breed contempt,
but it may subtly dilute deference.
The relationship between judges and government lawyers is forged as much
by our current mentoring efforts as by our past experiences. A healthy percentage of D.C. Circuit law clerks, for example, go on to work as government
lawyers. Although a judge will not sit on any cases in which a former clerk appears as counsel for two years after the clerkship, and clerks, in turn, cannot be
involved in any cases that were in the appeals court during their tenure, like
proud parents we keep abreast of our clerks’ progress and share court and DOJ
small talk with them. In addition, some of us participate in Advocacy Insti7
tutes, which train government lawyers from around the country, and in our circuit, government lawyers make up a healthy segment of invitees to the Judicial
Conference, where judges and lawyers build relationships in the course of discussing common concerns. Finally, when judges are sued in their official capacity (and it happens, not frequently but intermittently), they are usually de8
fended by government lawyers. There are, in sum, institutional connections
between federal judges and government lawyers that need not and do not impugn our partiality but rather emphasize our involvement in a common public
9
service enterprise.
It is because judges often see themselves in something of a supervisory role
10
in this enterprise that they are wont to say often and loudly that they expect a

6. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 406 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (footnotes omitted):
The authority of the President to control and supervise executive policymaking is derived
from the Constitution; the desirability of such control is demonstrable from the practical realities of administrative rulemaking. Regulations such as those involved here demand a careful weighing of cost, environmental, and energy considerations. They also have broad implications for national economic policy. Our form of government simply could not function
effectively or rationally if key executive policymakers were isolated from each other and
from the Chief Executive. Single mission agencies do not always have the answers to complex regulatory problems. An overworked administrator exposed on a 24-hour basis to a
dedicated but zealous staff needs to know the arguments and ideas of policymakers in other
agencies as well as in the White House.
7. Under the Code of Judicial Conduct, as currently interpreted, judges may not attend and speak
at “brown bag” lunches at a private firm, although they may speak at bar functions. See COMMITTEE
ON CODES OF CONDUCT, COMPENDIUM OF SELECTED OPINIONS §§ 4.5, 4.6(i) (1995).
8. See, e.g., Jones v. Gasch, 404 F.2d 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1967); JAMES EISENSTEIN, COUNSEL FOR
THE UNITED STATES 131 (1978).
9. Douglas Letter makes this point in Lawyering and Judging on Behalf of the United States: All I
Ask for is a Little Respect, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1295, 1296 (1993) (“I am not just a ‘lawyer.’ I am a
public servant who works in court.”).
10. See, e.g., EISENSTEIN, supra note 8, at 145 (quoting one judge as saying, “The U.S. attorney . . .
represents the government, which means everybody and nobody. There is no one there so directly
concerned to watch like a client would. So it’s partially my responsibility to see that the government
attorney does a good job.”).
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11

“higher standard” from a government lawyer, even as they acknowledge elsewhere that a great deal of the work government lawyers do is little different
12
from that of their counterparts in the private sector. Part, if not all, of this expectation results from the fact that the government lawyer’s client is seen as
being not simply the individual whose particular fate is being litigated but also
the U.S. citizenry at large, a client whose ultimate objective is that justice be
13
done. As one member of the profession writes, because government lawyers
are “public servant[s],” they should be held to “extremely high standards of
14
ethics, morality, and responsibility.” These standards manifest themselves in
ways that might be seen as antithetical to the lawyer’s role in private practice; a
government lawyer may feel obliged to alert an opposing lawyer about a technical defect in her papers that might result in her case being dismissed before it
gets to the merits or will “act in litigation in ways that seem to be against the
narrow interest of the client in a particular case but may be of overall benefit to
15
society.” The commentary to the American Bar Association’s Model Code of
Professional Conduct also sounds a public-minded note, stating that “[a] prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an ad16
vocate.”

11. See, e.g., Association of Am. Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. Clinton, 989 F. Supp. 8, 16 (D.D.C.
1997) (noting that DOJ “has a long tradition of setting the highest standards of conduct for all lawyers”).
12. See, e.g., Etelson v. Office of Personnel Mgt., 684 F.2d 918, 927 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(“[G]overnment and private litigators are simply lawyers on opposite sides of any given legal action.
One generally attacks agency action; the other generally defends it against the selfsame attacks. The
legal skills acquired in these pursuits are identical.”).
13. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935), overruled on other grounds, Stirone v.
United States, 361 U.S. 212 (1960):
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy,
but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation
to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win
a case, but that justice shall be done.
See also In re Bruce R. Lindsey (Grand Jury Testimony), 148 F.3d 1100, 1108 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(“Unlike a private practitioner, the loyalties of a government lawyer . . . cannot and must not lie solely
with his or her client agency.”). But see Catherine J. Lanctot, The Duty of Zealous Advocacy and the
Ethics of the Federal Government Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 951, 955
(1991) (“Government lawyers, for the most part, perceive their role as that of zealous advocates for
their agency clients, just like other lawyers representing private clients.”); Geoffrey P. Miller, Government Lawyers’ Ethics in a System of Checks and Balances, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1293, 1294-95 (1987)
(“Despite its surface plausibility, the notion that government attorneys represent some transcendental
‘public interest’ is, I believe, incoherent. It is commonplace that there are as many ideas of the ‘public
interest’ as there are people who think about the subject.”).
14. Letter, supra note 9, at 1296.
15. Id. at 1299. Such behavior is perhaps in deference to the inscription on the wall next to the
Attorney General’s office: “The United States wins its point whenever justice is done its citizens in the
courts.”
16. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.8 cmt. (1983); see also MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-14 (1981) (“A government lawyer in a civil action . . . has the
responsibility to seek justice and to develop a full and fair record, and he should not use his position or
the economic power of the government to harass parties or to bring about unjust settlements or results.”).

WALD.FMT.DOC

12/10/98 8:51 AM

Page 107: Winter 1998] GOVERNMENT LAWYERS IN COURT

111

Rarely, however, do judges describe the “higher standard” of conduct necessary to ensure justice, although it is almost always apparent when judges feel
their expectations have not been met (in other words, “I know it when I don’t
see it”). In my experience, judges in my circuit tend to get most irritated when
they think a government lawyer has fallen short in a criminal case, where
someone’s life or liberty is pitted against the public’s safety and welfare. In a
1992 drug case, for example, the court chastised government counsel for failing
to disclose fingerprint evidence until the eve of trial and for handing one of the
police witnesses—in full sight of the jury—a set of keys also previously undis17
closed to the defendant.
The court, which ordered a new trial on other
grounds, went out of its way to ensure that the government lawyer would play
by the rules in the next round:
We are confident that the government will take proper measures to ensure that both
the fingerprints and the keys will be properly disclosed to [the defendant] in advance
of trial. We do, however, note the less than professional
way in which the govern18
ment tried this case and reprove the government for it.

In another case, decided three months earlier, the court felt compelled to
“express its concern” about the government’s tactics on appeal, pointing to five
“material misstatements of the record” in the government’s brief and noting:
A lawyer appearing before us has a duty to assert facts only if, after a reasonably diligent inquiry, he believes those facts to be true. . . . That the Government made these
misstatements renders the conduct here even more egregious. . . . This court condemns unprofessional 19
conduct by the Government whether it results from incompetence or manipulation.

And in 1969, the court lamented the lack of control of a prosecutor who
told the jury in his closing argument in a first-degree murder case that the defendant “waited for her there with his gun, and shot her, stabbed her, and
20
kicked her—shot her down just like a dog.” Though not willing to reverse the
conviction, the judge delivered the following sermon against the excesses of
prosecutorial zeal:
The test of reversal is not the only test of appropriate conduct. The prosecutor may
“strike hard blows,” but not “foul.” We need not characterize the prosecution argument here as foul to conclude that the prosecution has an obligation to set an example
of professional conduct. The Government may prosecute vigorously, zealously with
hard blows if the facts warrant, for a criminal trial is not a minuet. Nevertheless, there
are standards which a Government counsel should meet to uphold the dignity of the
Government. The language of the prosecutor here was hardly in keeping with what
the Courts and the public expect of its representatives. We take this occasion to remind the bar, prosecutors and defense counsel alike, that we expect—indeed insist—
that their
conduct reflect that they are officers of the court as well as advocates for a
21
cause.

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

See United States v. Patrick, 959 F.2d 991 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
Id. at 995 n.5.
United States v. Williams, 952 F.2d 418, 421-22 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
Taylor v. United States, 413 F.2d 1095, 1096 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (citation omitted).
Id.
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In each of these three cases, the government attorney was found to have
committed an ethical or professional breach, but the reason underlying the
court’s disapproval seems to be slightly different in each situation. In the fingerprint case, the court’s concern seemed to be rooted in the inherent advantage the government has over a defendant in a criminal trial; the failure to disclose evidence in a timely fashion upsets the level playing field that the courts
22
have attempted to create. In the material misstatements case, the government
attorney violated norms applicable to all lawyers but was chastised for failing to
meet a higher standard of conduct because she represented the government.
And in the closing arguments case, the focus of the court’s reprimand was on
the special position prosecutors hold as representative of the people. None of
the three cases gives us any clear sense of what “higher standard” means in
courtroom practice beyond the factual scenario in that case, and in none did the
court extend its censure beyond public reproval of the government attorney.
This is not to say that the court is without power to do so; in the material misstatements case, the court noted that it had the authority to sanction the misconduct but
decided not to exercise [the court’s] authority in this case. . . . We do not wish to penalize the inexperienced author of the misstatements, beyond this public reprimand,
in view of the factual complexity of the case and the failure of the U.S. Attorney’s Office adequately to involve trial counsel in the supervision of the case on appeal. For
the future, the U.S. Attorney is on notice of the problem, and like any lawyer misleading23 the court, henceforth may expect to face the full extent of our sanction
power.

In light of warnings such as these, it is difficult to determine the level of
conduct by a government attorney in a criminal case that would be considered
beyond the pale and, on such an occasion, what the repercussions would be.
Apart from public censure in an opinion, the court could theoretically levy
costs or attorneys’ fees on the government, but this would prove unworkable in
the many criminal cases in which the conviction is ultimately affirmed or in
24
which the defense attorney is paid with public funds. (And, of course, prosecutors enjoy broad immunity from civil suits for any actions taken in the per25
formance of their prosecutorial duties. ) The lawyer’s malfeasance could, of

22. See, e.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (holding that the prosecution must disclose
material exculpatory evidence on request of defendant); FED R. CRIM P. 16 (listing evidence that must
be disclosed to defendant).
23. Williams, 952 F.2d at 422.
24. In the last session of Congress, however, an appropriations rider was added to H.R. 2267 that
allows courts, upon a criminal defendant’s request, to order the government to pay attorneys’ fees and
costs if the defendant is acquitted and the prosecution found to be “vexatious, frivolous, or in bad
faith,” so long as the defendant was not represented by a public defender. The bill, which was adamantly opposed by DOJ, was enacted into law on November 26, 1997. See Departments of Commerce,
Justice, and State, The Judiciary and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 105-119, tit. 6,
§ 617, 111 Stat. 2440, 2519 (1997). Similarly, in the civil arena, the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28
U.S.C. § 2412 (1994), awards attorneys’ fees to a private party who prevails against the government
and who can show that the government’s position was not “substantially justified.” Id. §
2412(d)(1)(A).
25. See, e.g., Moore v. Valder, 65 F.3d 189 (D.C. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 75 (1996).

WALD.FMT.DOC

12/10/98 8:51 AM

Page 107: Winter 1998] GOVERNMENT LAWYERS IN COURT

113

course, be referred to the local bar’s disciplinary committee or to his supervisors at the U.S. Attorney’s Office or DOJ for the appropriate disciplinary ac26
tion. In almost all cases, however, the court relies on public reproval to deter
repetitions, and I am not aware of any case in recent memory in which our
27
court has sanctioned a government attorney.
To balance these public admonitions, the court does recognize when a government attorney performs up to snuff in a criminal case and shoulders the
government’s burden to ensure that justice is done. This burden includes, most
28
notably, the disclosure of exculpatory evidence as well as the identification of
errors that the trial judge may have made in applying the complex federal Sentencing Guidelines, even when those errors accrue to the advantage of the gov29
ernment. Thus, in a recent case concerning a conviction for drug trafficking,
the court commended the government attorney for bringing to the court’s attention the fact that the defendant could not be convicted of both
“distribution” and “distribution near a school” under the same facts and there30
fore that one conviction must be vacated. Had the shoe been on the other
foot, there would, of course, have been no similar obligation on the part of defense counsel to alert the court to the fact that the government had missed an
opportunity to seek an increase in the defendant’s sentence.
Although most of the remonstrances by judges of government lawyers tend
to occur in criminal cases, where emotions run high and tempers occasionally
flare, government lawyers may fail to meet their “higher standard” in civil cases
as well. Perhaps the most notable example occurred in 1992, when then-Chief
Judge Mikva, writing for the court, delivered a searing manifesto to a Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) lawyer who had continued to press
an appeal even though the case had become moot:
Ordinarily, we would handle such a manner in an unpublished order. We write, however, to express our displeasure with FERC counsel’s failure to take easy and obvious
steps to avoid needless litigation. . . . Many lawyers would have seen the possibility of
settlement as soon as FERC issued its open access order, mooting the present challenge. . . . Despite the benefits of settlement and the pointlessness of proceeding,
FERC’s counsel did not try to contact opposing counsel to explore whether vacating
the [challenged] orders would resolve the case; nor did FERC’s counsel recommend
that the Commission file a motion to have this court remand the orders so that FERC
26. The Department of Justice does not recognize the total authority of state and local bars to discipline its lawyers, especially where local rules forbid conduct of which the Department approves, such
as contacting a witness directly rather than through her lawyer. See Letter, supra note 9, at 1302-04.
The Eighth Circuit recently invalidated the regulation that authorized such ex parte contacts, holding
that it could not supersede local rules to the contrary. See United States v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,
132 F.3d 1252 (8th Cir. 1998) (invalidating 28 C.F.R. § 77.10(a)).
27. Sanctions against government attorneys are not, however, unheard of in the district courts.
See, e.g., Association of Am. Physicians & Surgeons v. Clinton, 989 F. Supp. 8 (D.D.C. 1997).
28. This disclosure is mandated by Brady. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); see also supra note 22 and accompanying text.
29. Similarly, the Solicitor General, when arguing a criminal matter before the U.S. Supreme
Court, is obligated to “confess error” by bringing to the Court’s attention any fundamental errors that
have occurred with respect to a federal criminal conviction. See, e.g., Drew S. Days, The Interests of
the United States, the Solicitor General and Individual Rights, 41 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1, 4 (1996).
30. See United States v. Edmonds, 69 F.3d 1172, 1178 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
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could vacate them unilaterally. FERC’s counsel did not even disclose in the brief he
drafted and filed with this court the Commission’s position on vacating the challenged
31
orders, leaving the impression that the Commission might oppose vacating them.

The court then made clear that it was, as FERC’s counsel complained at
oral argument, holding government lawyers to a different standard:
The notion that government lawyers have obligations beyond those of private lawyers
did not originate in oral argument in this case. A government lawyer “is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy,” the Supreme Court said long ago in
a statement chiseled on the walls of the Justice Department, “but of a sovereignty
whose obligation . . . is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.” The
Supreme Court was speaking of government prosecutors [in that case], but no one, to
our knowledge (at least prior to oral argument), has suggested that the principal does
not apply with equal force to the government’s civil lawyers. . . .
We stress, to conclude, that we are concerned not so much with the failings of FERC’s
counsel in this case, but with the underlying view of a government lawyer’s responsibilities that counsel revealed at oral argument. We find it astonishing that an attorney
for a federal administrative agency could so unblushingly deny that a government
lawyer has obligations
that might sometimes trump the desire to pound an opponent
32
into submission.

As in the criminal arena, warnings such as these are more frequent than
33
sanctions, leaving government attorneys somewhat in the dark about the lim34
its of zealous advocacy. Litigating strategies are often complicated, moreover,
by unsettled doctrines that prove difficult for any lawyer to navigate. Judges
sometimes criticize government lawyers for asserting various technical defenses—standing, ripeness, finality, failure to exhaust administrative remedies,
35
nonjusticiability—in an attempt to avoid proceeding to the merits of a case.
But determining what may or may not be an appropriate threshold objection is
not always crystalline, as one government lawyer has noted:
Many federal judges seem to assume that the Department of Justice automatically
raises these arguments without proper reflection on their applicability and force in the
context of a particular case. Although reflexive argument along these lines plainly
does occur in some instances, much of the responsibility for the problem lies with the
judges. Most of these threshold defenses are judge-made and very difficult to apply.
I defy anyone to examine the Supreme Court’s decisions on standing over the past
twenty-five years and to reconcile them and discern from them clear rules that can be
applied to the wide variety of cases that arise. Trying to fit those Supreme Court

31. Freeport-McMoRan Oil & Gas Co. v. FERC, 962 F.2d 45, 46-47 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
32. Id. at 47-48.
33. See, e.g., Mississippi River Transmission Corp. v. FERC, 969 F.2d 1215, 1217 n.2 (D.C. Cir.
1992) (expressing “extreme displeasure over FERC’s tactics” and warning that “[a]ny repeat performance will be subject to sanctions”).
34. Here, too, however, the court recognizes professional conduct. See, e.g., Odin v. United States,
656 F.2d 798, 803 n.22 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (“We commend the government for the non-hypertechnical
attitude it has taken [in its brief] towards this regulation, and for its willingness to see that justice is
done.”).
35. In a recent year, the government raised such defenses in 51% of administrative agency appeals. See Patricia M. Wald, Judicial Review in Midpassage: The Uneasy Partnership Between Courts
and Agencies Plays on, 32 TULSA L.J. 221, 248 (1996). Efforts to secure dismissals were successful in
28% of these cases. See id. at 256.
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precedents with the widely varying
rulings by different panels within the D.C. Circuit
36
only aggravates the difficulty.

While one judge is chastising a government attorney for raising these defenses, another is criticizing her for not doing so. On one occasion, a panel of
our court required a submission to the court, signed by the Assistant Attorney
General in charge of the division, setting out the division’s policy about raising
37
standing in all cases in which it could reasonably be argued. As long as that
point of view is represented on the court, it may be asking too much of government lawyers to make critical judgments about whether prudential defenses
can be waived in furtherance of a debate on the substance of the law. The everpresent risk that the parties will be required to go back to square one because
such a step was missed, with the attendant waste of the court’s time as well as
the parties’, is not conducive to a freely discriminating choice about when to
use or eschew jurisdictional objections, prudential or otherwise.
So perhaps in situations in which the government enjoys no particular advantage, it is a bit unfair to require more of the government lawyer simply be38
cause he or she represents “the people.” This argument is weaker, however,
when the case concerns an area that should be within the government lawyer’s
particular realm of knowledge. For example, courts are often frustrated when
government counsel fail to inform them of new developments within the agency
that might bear on the issue at hand. In one case, when neither the government
lawyer nor the petitioner alerted the court to a revised FERC policy that put
the order under review in question, the court devoted only a one-sentence
39
footnote to admonishing the petitioner but a full paragraph to criticizing government counsel:
[W]e are constrained to express our dismay with the Commission’s failure to mention
the revision of its capacity-brokering policy in its brief to the court. Counsel for
FERC acknowledged the change only when directly confronted with the pertinent
FERC decisions at oral argument. We expect more from Government counsel.
When an agency changes a policy or rule underlying a decision pending review, the
agency should immediately inform the court and should either move on its own for a
remand or
explain how its decision can be sustained independently of the policy in
40
question.

In another case, the court reproved the government for not informing it until appeal that a new Medicare form would soon be implemented that would
likely remedy the deficiencies in the challenged form:
We previously have emphasized that counsel are required to inform the courts of outside developments that might affect the outcome of litigation. And counsel for the
government, no less than their colleagues in the private sector, are bound by the same

36. Letter, supra note 9, at 1310-11 (footnote omitted).
37. See Supplemental Brief for the Federal Appellees, National Mining Ass’n v. United States
Dep’t of Interior, 70 F.3d 1345 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Nos. 94-5353, 94-5388, 95-5028).
38. One commentator has suggested that, in fact, the ethical codes “draw no distinctions between
the duty of the government lawyer and the duty of the private lawyer to defend a civil case zealously.”
Lanctot, supra note 13, at 958.
39. See Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. FERC, 890 F.2d 435, 439 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
40. Id. at 439 (citation omitted).
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obligations to the court. There is, indeed, much to suggest that government counsel
have a higher duty to uphold
because their client is not only the agency they represent
41
but also the public at large.

Despite this transgression, which “in a traditional case between two private
parties . . . would foreclose [the party who failed to raise a relevant development] from relying on that change in circumstance during the remainder of the
42
litigation,” the court agreed to consider the new form, citing the “different
ground rules” that apply when public policy is at stake. The lesson to be
learned is that although government counsel may receive the brunt of the
court’s ire for failing to tell the court of new developments, ultimately they may
also pay a lesser price because of the public policy dangers in ignoring these
developments, whenever revealed.
It is indeed the public policy implications of the issues government counsel
litigate that often lead a court to expect a wider perspective about a particular
case from a government attorney than from a private attorney. A government
attorney arguing before us can anticipate that she will be peppered with questions such as “Why is the government doing this?”; “Doesn’t the government
care about the consequences?”; and “What is the government’s interest in expending taxpayers’ money on this case?” Naturally, there is no similar inquiry
directed at private counsel; we know they are there to advance singlemindedly
their client’s interests, which are usually monetary in nature. But a sense lingers in the minds of some judges that the government’s objectives in individual
cases need to be probed to protect against the occasional abuse of government
power. We expect government lawyers to be attentive to the implications that
43
a case will have on future cases and on the development of the law, whereas
we expect that a private lawyer will simply “win this day and let tomorrow take
44
care of itself.” The reverberations of our decision will likely be felt beyond
the agency that is a party to the case, and so we feel the need to be informed of
likely changes to relevant policies as a result of our holding. Thus, government
lawyers can anticipate questions about what effect this holding may have in a
variety of similar or even not-so-similar settings, even though they may understandably be reluctant to answer them for fear of revealing litigation or settlement strategies in other cases.

41. Gray Panthers v. Schweiker, 716 F.2d 23, 33 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (citation omitted); see also
Douglas v. Donovan, 704 F.2d 1276, 1279 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (stating that government attorneys “have
special responsibilities to both [the] court and the public at large”).
42. Gray Panthers, 716 F.2d at 33.
43. See Days, supra note 29, at 3:
As a government lawyer, speaking for the Justice Department and the United States of
America, one was expected to approach litigation with a bit more reserve and to advance
one’s arguments in the knowledge that their impact would undoubtedly reach beyond one
case and one court to the entire federal judicial system.
44. See, e.g., Pilon v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 73 F.3d 1111, 1122 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (stating
that DOJ’s narrow interpretation of prohibited “disclosure” in the instant case “would completely contravene the Privacy Act’s basic goals” and make it “an easy tool for manipulating and circumventing
the Privacy Act’s limited exceptions to the bar against disclosure”).
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At first glance, this might seem like an attempt by the federal courts to inject themselves into the public policy debate, a role some see as properly reserved for the elected branches. Yet it is nearly impossible to guarantee the fidelity of Congress’s intent in drafting statutes and to defer to agencies’
45
reasonable interpretations of those statutes without engaging in some discussion of the policy behind the statute in question, including the projected results
of the particular interpretation of that congressional policy adopted by the
agency. Similarly, when a court reviews agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act, the court’s decision comes down to whether that action was
“arbitrary and capricious”—in other words, whether the action was reason46
able. So while courts are told not to second-guess agency policymaking, we
need an understanding of how the challenged action fits into the overall regulatory scheme and into the agency’s larger policy perspective in order to evaluate
its rationality. The government lawyer should be prepared to aid the court in
that endeavor.
In addition, because the court views the government lawyer as the spokesperson for an institution that is often a repeat player, it not only feels free to
question her about how that institution works but also to employ her as a conduit to carry messages back to the agency regarding its litigating practices.
47
These judicial “observations” are occasionally set out in the court’s opinion
but are more often offered informally at oral argument (such as “Haven’t we
48
seen enough of this so-called expert witness?” ). Technically, if the practice is
49
not reversible error, it is not our concern, yet the continual engagement of
courts and government counsel makes such a dialogue almost inevitable. There
are, of course, other fora for such exchanges, but none so likely to command
the government’s attention as an observation delivered during oral argument.
It seems clear, then, that courts hold government lawyers to something of a
higher standard, even if how that standard is defined remains amorphous. One
government attorney, however, has taken issue with the stricter approach, arguing that, if anything, the federal courts, and the D.C. Circuit in particular,
should be more deferential to government lawyers in such matters as extending
deadlines or granting petitions for rehearing and rehearing en banc. The gov45. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
46. See Arent v. Shalala, 70 F.3d 610 (D.C. Cir. 1995), for conflicting judicial views of the overlap
between Chevron’s Step 2 and arbitrary and capricious review under the Administrative Procedure
Act. See also Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 1253 (1997).
47. See, e.g., United States v. Smart, 98 F.3d 1379, 1389 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct.
1271 (1997) (stating that the court was “comforted to learn from government counsel at argument that
the government no longer engages in posing . . . mirroring hypothetical questions to its experts at trial.
We are thus confident this case represents the end of the line on this problematic practice”).
48. After skeptical questions from several panels, the court was informed at one oral argument
that a government expert in the modus operandi of the drug trade, who figured prominently in at least
38 appeals in five years, had been “retired” from his expert witness status.
49. There is a doctrine of supervisory jurisdiction of appellate courts over the administration of
criminal justice in the federal district courts, but its reach over officials of another branch is problematic. See, e.g., United States v. Cicero, 22 F.3d 1156, 1160 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
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ernment lawyer, he argues, is different from other counsel in that he more carefully reviews such litigating decisions and makes such requests only when it is
deemed prudent or necessary, such as when additional time is needed to obtain
50
authorization to proceed from a high-level officer. Although he acknowledges
that “[j]udicial recognition of the substantial distinction between government
attorneys and private practitioners should not lead to an inappropriate and potentially detrimental intimacy between the Judicial and Executive Branches,”
he argues in favor of some official recognition of the difference, leaving the
“appropriate limits to the functional use of that distinction” to be “developed
51
over time.”
I admit to being a skeptic about any articulated presumption or privilege
52
that favors the government in litigation. It is not only the slippery slope I fear
from the first official acknowledgment that government lawyers are somehow
“special,” but also a mindset that might detract from the court’s ever-present
duty vigilantly to protect individual citizens from governmental transgressions.
In fact, our court has had an enlightening experience when declining to create
an exception for the government. In 1987, we began a modest appellate settlement program aimed at those cases in which no unsettled principles of law were
involved and in which it appeared that the stakes simply did not justify the time
and expense that full-press consideration by the court would entail. Under the
program, cases selected by the court’s staff counsel pursuant to specific criteria
would be assigned to an experienced lawyer-mediator who would conduct one
mandatory mediation session, with subsequent sessions held at the option of
53
the parties. DOJ was initially pessimistic that any of its cases on appeal would
be appropriate for mediation and at one point asked to be exempted completely from the program. Mediators, for their part, reported that government
lawyers typically were unhelpful in settling cases because they required approval from their superiors in the DOJ, which was often long in coming.
These attitudes changed, however, once one of our judges became Solicitor
General and widely endorsed the program inside DOJ and with U.S. Attorneys. The court worked out an arrangement with DOJ whereby persons with
authority to settle cases would be available by phone to the government lawyer
if settlement looked imminent. In addition, the court authorized the mediators,
in their discretion, to request that agency representatives attend the mediation
sessions if it appeared that it was the lawyer—and not the agency—who was resistant to settlement and to communicate offers directly to those representatives (with prior notice to government counsel). As a result, the District of
Columbia and federal governments are now involved in more than one-third of
all mediated cases and are able to reach settlement in roughly one-third of Dis50. See Letter, supra note 9, at 1305.
51. Id. at 1307.
52. In fact, our court does allow a longer period after entry of judgment in which to file an en banc
petition in a case involving the government (45 days) than when only private parties are involved (30
days). See D.C. CIR. R. 35.
53. See id. at app. III.
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trict cases and thirty percent of federal cases referred to the program. Moreover, alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”) has, of late, become a much55
touted approach to litigation inside government agencies. It will be interesting to see whether judges, through the review of settlements obtained by
agency ADR programs, impose any “higher standards” on government counsel
56
conducting settlement negotiations than they do on private parties.
III
THE GOVERNMENT LAWYER IN COURT: SOME SUGGESTIONS
The courts have offered little by way of concrete suggestions as to what is
included in the “higher standard” expected from government counsel. I offer
for incorporation into that “higher standard” to which judges refer so often and
so vaguely the following five “high Cs”: competence, candor, credibility, civility, and consistency.
A. Competence
On the whole, judges expect a level of competence from government attorneys—even new and inexperienced ones—that we do not expect from private
counsel. We have come to wince at the misspellings and typographical errors,
the punctuation mistakes and gaps in logic, and the omitted precedent that appear with lamentable frequency in the product of private attorneys, but we become downright agitated when we see the same errors in the government’s
work. While we recognize that private firms range in size from the one person
shop to the multi-hundred lawyer firm, we view the U.S. government—of which
there is only one—as a large organization with the financial and intellectual resources to train its lawyers before it sends them to court. We expect agency attorneys to be acquainted with relevant precedent and current developments
and to lend the court the benefit of their experience in litigating similar cases.
Because so many agencies are repeat players in our court, their lawyers quickly
develop reputations—on either end of the spectrum—that can subtly affect the
court’s attitude toward their clients if such standards are not met.
B. Candor
Of course, all counsel should be honest and truthful in their dealings with
the court. Realistically, however, courts know that while private counsel must
answer direct questions truthfully, they need not voluntarily disclose everything
about their client’s motivations or plans. The government lawyer, by contrast,
54. See Memorandum from Nancy Stanley, ADR Program Director, to Patricia M. Wald (Nov. 13,
1997) (on file with author); see also Patricia M. Wald, “. . . Doctor, Lawyer, Merchant, Chief”, 60 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1127, 1135-36 (1992).
55. See Patricia M. Wald, ADR and the Courts: An Update, 1997 DUKE L.J. 1445.
56. See, e.g., Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1467 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (setting forth
standards for safeguarding employees’ statutory rights in review of mandatory private arbitration
agreements).
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is seen as having a duty to disclose to the court impending developments at the
agency level—at least those that have moved beyond the mere discussion
stage—that might signal a new policy direction or, in some other way, change
the significance of the issue in dispute. Admittedly, government counsel must
tread carefully: He cannot disclose internal deliberations—he may not even
have the authority to discuss alternative factual scenarios—but he cannot ignore the court’s questions. To some extent, he is protected by the post hoc rationalization rule, which permits the court to consider only the reasons given by
the agency for its actions and not ones proffered by counsel in the course of
57
litigation. But the court’s cognizance of this rule is not likely to preclude its
questions regarding the agency’s overarching policy. Government lawyers
would do well to anticipate such questions and obtain whatever authority they
need from the agency to answer them in court.
Some of these questions are likely to concern the motivation for a particular
government action. Courts are well aware that agencies are not apolitical outfits and that some of the positions taken have been influenced by political and
58
administration intervention. Theoretically, if an agency has interpreted a statute reasonably and can point to evidence in the record to support its action, its
motivation is irrelevant. Some decisions, however, are sufficiently tinged with
obvious political considerations that a curious court is likely to dig beneath the
surface. During the heyday of the Council on Competitiveness in the OMB, for
example, agency rulemaking proposals were often sent back by the Council to
the agencies for revision or alternatives more closely keyed to broader administrative goals. On some occasions, however, the rationale from the old rule had
not been changed sufficiently to accommodate the new result, and in these
cases, the court, not unexpectedly, was likely to ask government counsel what

57. See, e.g., National Wildlife Fed’n v. Browner, 127 F.3d 1126, 1129 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (stating that
agency litigating positions are not entitled to deference when they are merely counsel’s post hoc rationalization for agency action).
58. See Neal Devins, Unitariness and Independence: Solicitor General Control over Independent
Agency Litigation, 82 CAL. L. REV. 255, 284-85 (1994) (footnotes omitted), which describes the following interventions by the White House in litigating positions taken by the Solicitor General:
Modern accounts of such intervention include the following: Harry Truman’s involvement in
an amicus curiae filing in Shelly v. Kraemer; Dwight Eisenhower’s drafting of portions of the
government’s brief in Brown v. Board of Education; the Kennedy Administration’s order to
Archibald Cox to challenge private discrimination as unconstitutional state action; the Nixon
Administration’s intervention in the Solicitor General’s filing in the Pentagon Papers case
and its involvement in school desegregation and antitrust matters; Gerald Ford’s brokerage of
a dispute between the FEC and the Solicitor General in Buckley v. Valeo and Ford Administration participation in school desegregation cases and Department of Interior matters; the
Carter White House’s reversal of the Solicitor General’s preliminary position in Bakke; the
Reagan Administration’s reversal of the Solicitor General’s stated position in Bob Jones University and its insistence that the Solicitor General file an amicus brief calling for the overturning of Roe v. Wade in Thornburg v. College of Obstetricians; President Bush’s order to the
Solicitor General to reverse its position in the Supreme Court and support increased state aid
to black public colleges to remedy discrimination; and President Clinton’s indirect rebuke of
the Solicitor General’s brief in Knox v. United States, a child pornography case.
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had happened to the rule along the route from the agency to the courthouse.
In such cases, counsel must be candid about what is on the public record, but
after that he is on his own, sometimes trapped between his duty to the court
and his loyalty to his agency client. Courts understand his predicament, but this
will not end their inquiry into the real reasons for the actions they are asked to
affirm.
C. Credibility

Private lawyers are not required to believe in the causes of their clients; the
same is true for government lawyers. Many young lawyers in both camps adopt
a diffident approach toward defending positions in court with which they do not
personally agree, justifying this attitude on the theory that everyone—including
the government, which in most cases cannot turn to outside counsel—deserves
to be represented; these lawyers believe it is up to the court to make the ultimate choices between the right and wrong result in particular cases. Still, a
lawyer’s alliance with or detachment from the position he takes may subtly affect the energy and enthusiasm with which he undertakes the assignment as
well as how he projects the position in court. With changes in administrations,
many government counsel understand that, at least in DOJ, lawyers are not required, at the peril of ending their careers, to represent government policy that
60
collides with their most fundamental beliefs. (The “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy on gays in the military is one example, I am told, where lawyers sincerely
opposed to the policy are excused from defending it.) This kind of leeway is
wise policy for an agency; given that the government is a vast enterprise required to take on a multitude of subjects, the possibilities of both conflict and
61
substitution are greater. It is also wise for government counsel to take their
employer up on the offer: Their discomfort is often discernible to the court,
and no government counsel should be asked to ignore deeply felt convictions
(so long as he does not have too many).
D. Civility
The court expects (but does not always find) civility from its counsel toward
one another. It is safe to say, however, that we are probably less tolerant of in-

The same kind of influence has, on occasion, been found to be exerted by an administration on DOJ
attorneys in the lower courts. See, e.g., Association of Am. Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. Clinton, 989
F. Supp. 8, 16 (D.D.C. 1997) (describing pressure from White House attorneys regarding DOJ’s arguments before court).
59. See, e.g., New York v. Reilly, 969 F.2d 1147, 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (stating that EPA’s change
of heart in not including a ban on burning of lead-acid vehicle batteries in its final rule after criticisms
by OMB and the Competitiveness Council not adequately explained).
60. See, e.g., Lanctot, supra note 13, at 1003 n.218 (noting that DOJ attorneys strongly opposed to
legality of drug testing on federal employees are ordinarily excused from defending the policy).
61. For a discussion of conscience conflicts for the government lawyer, see Patricia M. Wald,
Whose Public Interest Is It Anyway?, 47 ME. L. REV. 3 (1995). See also Barbara Allen Babcock, Defending the Government: Justice and the Civil Division, 23 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 181 (1990)
(describing conflict in roles government lawyers must play).
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civility, sarcasm, or belittling of an opponent when it comes from government
attorneys than from private ones. This, I believe, is due to an underlying notion
that we are all part of the same government; government attorneys’ insensitiv62
ity reflects on the court as well.
Our concern for civility extends to signs of gender, ethnic, or racial bias,
whether intentional or unintentional. Although thirty-seven percent of lawyers
63
in the U.S. Attorney’s office in the District of Columbia are women, some female attorneys throughout the government have expressed frustration with the
gender-based behavior of their colleagues—for example, informal modes of
address, frequent interruptions, and nonrecognition as attorneys—as well as the
perceived limitations on their upward mobility due to a lack of mentors and exclusion from “macho” inner circles. Four of nine trial judges interviewed for
the D.C. Gender, Race, and Ethnic Bias Task Force Project believed that race
64
played a role in some prosecutors’ charging decisions. Judges uniformly expect the government lawyer to keep in mind that his role as representative of
the people should be all-inclusive. As one former Solicitor General has noted,
the government lawyer and the courts are both employed by the same entity
and thus have the same ultimate goals. As a result, “the government lawyer
must be more sensitive to the values on the other side of the lawsuit than is true
of lawyers in general. . . . [T]he government’s opponent . . . is also part of the
65
public whose total interest the lawyer serves.”
E. Consistency
Consistency in government positions taken before the same court or different courts is one of the most vexing aspects of the relationship between judges
and government lawyers. The problem arises in a variety of forms and contexts.
1. Consistency in the Same Case. In an era where the same basic factual
dispute is capable of being legally conceptualized to give rise to several actions
in several courts involving the same parties, the potential for inconsistent
positions by government lawyers is a legitimate concern. I had one such
experience in a Voting Rights Act case several years ago, where the
62. Cf. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 4, at Canon 3A(3):
A judge should be patient, dignified, respectful, and courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses,
lawyers, and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity, and should require
similar conduct of those subject to the judge’s control, including lawyers to the extent consistent with their role in the adversary process.
63. See 1 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS (DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT), GENDER,
RACE, AND ETHNIC BIAS TASK FORCE PROJECT IN THE D.C. CIRCUIT IV, A-19 (1995) (1993-94 figures).
64. See id. at IV B-143.
65. Rex E. Lee, Lawyering for the Government: Politics, Polemics and Principle, 47 OHIO ST. L.J.
595, 596 (1986). But see Lanctot, supra note 13, at 994 (arguing that because the government lawyer
represents the Executive Branch, imposing on government lawyers a greater duty to the courts than on
private attorneys “could present a serious interference with the separation of powers between the judicial and executive branches”).
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government’s position under the Section 5 preclearance action appeared to me
at least to be at odds with the position taken before another federal panel
across the country considering the same factual scenario but under Section 2’s
anti-discrimination ban. It takes only one such experience, real or perceived, to
make a judge wary. The problem of nationally coordinating legal arguments
and positions is a formidable one and can, on occasion, be extremely frustrating
for a government lawyer. Nonetheless, judges do have, and should have, a right
to expect consistency in the positions the government takes in different aspects
of the same underlying case.
In one recent case, for instance, the government urged us to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds an affirmative suit brought by an individual under threat of
a deportation order, assuring us that the plaintiff would have an opportunity
66
through habeas proceedings to pursue her constitutional challenge. In a petition for rehearing, however, the petitioner claimed that the government’s subsequent argument in another circuit, where an appeal from the original deportation order was pending, contradicted the government’s “concessions” before
our court by asserting that there was no forum in which her claims could be
raised. (The government, naturally, denied this characterization of its actions.)
The exchange underscores how important it is for government lawyers to ensure that they do not contradict themselves—or even subtly color the way in
which they relate or challenge facts—before different courts embroiled in the
same basic matter.
Within one court, two frequent sources of tension between government
lawyers and judges arise. The first is irritating, although unavoidable: the occasional need for government lawyers to recede altogether from a position taken
in a particular case because of a decision made by their superiors and confess
error or withdraw a petition or defense altogether. Judges understand the dynamics of the situation but are not likely to be pleased about their wasted time
and effort. The second lies in the very attenuated process the government goes
through in deciding when to request an en banc hearing in our court, a process
similar to the one it goes through when deciding to seek certiorari from the Supreme Court. When the government loses an appeal, especially after a fervent
performance by counsel before the panel parading the horribles that will ensue
if its position is not adopted, a dissenting judge who has embraced the government’s cause will wait expectantly for the government to ask for rehearing en
67
banc—often, as it turns out, in vain, “seduced and abandoned,” as it were. Of
course, the government has many factors to weigh in deciding when to go up or
even court-wide for another shot, but the dissenting judge who has gone out on
a limb only to find the government did not really think it was a top priority after all is apt to feel frustrated and perhaps less willing to entertain such pleas in
66. See Ramallo v. Reno, 114 F.3d 1210, 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“[A]s the Government concedes,
habeas review remains available”); Appellee’s Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing
En Banc (under seal).
67. Cf. Wald, supra note 54, at 1142 n.36 (describing practice of “concurring dissents” to encourage requests for en banc review).
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the next case. This conduct is particularly irksome when it appears that the decision to press forward has been made for reasons apart from the merits of the
case itself. Most judges assume that the government must surely be beyond
bringing cases on a “run it up the flagpole and see if it salutes” basis, and so it
ought to be prepared to go forward unless it is truly convinced that the court
that ruled against it was correct in the end. It may be, as my Irish grandmother
used to say, that “he who fights and runs away, lives to fight another day,” but
the government lawyer should realize that there are casualties left behind.
2. Consistency in Similar Cases. In the same vein, we expect government
lawyers to be reasonably consistent about the positions they take in similar
cases. A private lawyer sometimes argues one meaning of a precedent one day
and another meaning in a different case another day, but we would be outraged
68
if the government did the same.
This is the reason judges often ask
government counsel if what they are arguing represents the policy of their
office and whether it is being applied consistently to other litigants similarly
situated. Sometimes the judge will ask for documentation that this is so; equal
treatment of those subject to regulation ranks high on most judges’ priority
lists, and if it looks as though the agency is not evenly applying its policies
across the board, these judges will want to know why not.
Similarly, we often chide the government lawyer who uses legislative history
as an aid to statutory interpretation in one case where he is helped by such a
technique but argues plain meaning in the next case with no reference to legislative history because that suits his ends. Although the contours of the textualism debate are generally loose enough to permit the government to vary its
69
mode of statutory interpretation between cases, our underlying belief is that
the big law office of the U.S. government should keep its interpretations of
cases and statutes consistent and should not tilt them in favor of the outcome
desired in each case.
Consistency in the treatment of similar cases also brings us to the thorny
topic of intracircuit nonacquiescence, that is, the refusal of an agency to honor
70
relevant circuit precedent in subsequent cases before the agency. When an

68. Cf. Barry Tarlow, Rico Report: Inconsistent Arguments in Successive Cases and the Obligations
of Defense Lawyers—Is Defense Different?, THE CHAMPION, Jan.-Feb. 1998, at 44 (considering
whether defense lawyers have an ethical duty to avoid inconsistent arguments in successive cases).
69. The judges in the D.C. Circuit as well as the justices in the Supreme Court are a mix of textualists and interpretivists (those who use legislative history liberally to inform text). Perhaps because of
my heavy exposure to the legislative process in my congressional liaison job, I favor the latter position.
See, e.g., Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: Use of Legislative History in Construing Statutes, 39
AM. U. L. REV. 277 (1990). I do concede, however, that it is tricky business for a government lawyer
(or any lawyer) arguing an issue of statutory interpretation before a mixed court of textualists and interpretivists.
70. See Matthew Diller & Nancy Morawetz, Intracircuit Nonacquiescence and the Breakdown of
the Rule of Law: A Response to Estreicher and Revesz, 99 YALE L.J. 801 (1991); Samuel Estreicher &
Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679 (1989);
Samuel Figler, Executive Agency Nonacquiescence to Judicial Opinions, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1664
(1993).
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agency decides not to apply a circuit precedent to all similar cases arising in
that circuit, each individual litigant affected has to file or defend another suit
and the court has to render another judgment—the court, of course (barring en
banc review), being controlled by its own precedent and thus compelled to rule
in the same manner as it did in the earlier case.
Agencies typically justify intracircuit nonacquiescence by a perceived need
to administer a statute uniformly throughout the nation and by a separation of
powers theory that permits the executive branch to act independently so long
as it is not in violation of the law. Critics of intracircuit nonacquiescence cite
separation of powers to the opposite effect, emphasizing that, in the words of
71
Marbury v. Madison, it is the duty of the courts “to say what the law is” and
that it is the duty of agencies to follow that law. Critics also sometimes suggest
that agencies may risk violating the Equal Protection Clause by applying the
law in different ways to similarly situated litigants, with the result that a person’s ability to take advantage of circuit precedent depends on her financial
ability to appeal the agency’s decision. Courts are understandably very hostile
to intracircuit nonacquiescence, although, in the words of one commentator,
they “respond[] in typical fashion by delivering a scathing criticism of the prac72
tice but tak[e] no substantive action.” (In 1983, the Ninth Circuit declared the
practice unconstitutional, but the Supreme Court ducked the question thanks
to a congressional enactment that ended intracircuit nonacquiescence in Social
73
Security Administration cases. ) A government lawyer would be well advised
to avoid, if he can possibly do so, arguing intracircuit nonacquiescence, which
puts him in an adversarial position vis-à-vis the very court before which he is
74
pleading.
More frequently, however, agencies will engage in intercircuit nonacquiescence: They will follow circuit precedent for all appeals heard in that circuit
but will not treat that precedent as authoritative in circuits that have previously
75
ruled in the agency’s favor or that have yet to rule on the issue. This practice
has more to commend it. Most federal laws are national in scope; for some,
challenges must be brought exclusively in one circuit but for many others (and
for some enforcement proceedings), the initiator of the action may choose the
forum. Thus the government may find itself in several circuits, simultaneously
or seriatim, with different results in each case. Since the Supreme Court has
71. 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
72. Figler, supra note 70, at 1665.
73. See Lopez v. Heckler, 725 F.2d 1489 (9th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 469 U.S. 1082 (1984).
74. A proposed Federal Agency Compliance Bill, H.R. 1544, 105th Cong. (1997), would make intracircuit nonacquiescence more difficult; it bars “unjustifiable” nonacquiescence unless the identity of
the reviewing circuit is unclear, the government could not have sought review of the controlling decision, or the precedential value of the decision is questionable. The Judicial Conference endorses the
bill; DOJ is opposed to it. See OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES COURTS, LEGISLATIVE SURVEY, 105TH CONG. 3738 (1997).
75. Often, because of the choice of fora, an agency cannot predict where a particular appeal will
be brought. See, e.g., Purolator Armored, Inc. v. NLRB, 764 F.2d 1423 (11th Cir. 1985) (National Labor Relations Board); Stieberger v. Bowen, 801 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1986) (Social Security Administration).
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the final judicial word on any issue of federal constitutional or statutory law,
which may be long in coming, the government will not want to be bound by a
preliminary negative result in a lower court unless it is convinced that the decision is right. So may the government seek, circuit by circuit, the result it desires
on a particular issue, given that each circuit develops law independently? And
when it confronts national or multistate organizations, may it commence a new
suit in a more favorable circuit when an adverse decision involving the same
opponent has already been rendered in one circuit?
The Supreme Court has spoken a few—but only a few—words on the sub76
ject. In United States v. Mendoza, the Court held that the usual rules for collateral estoppel are not applicable to the government:
The conduct of government litigation in the courts of the United States is sufficiently
different from the conduct of private civil litigation in those courts so that what might
otherwise be economy interests underlying a broad application of collateral77estoppel
are outweighed by the constraints which particularly affect the Government.

In short, collateral estoppel may not be applied against the government if
the parties are not the same. This inheres in the unique position of a government lawyer: While private litigants who do not appeal unfavorable rulings can
be held to have waived their right to relitigate the issue, “the Solicitor General
considers a variety of factors, such as the limited resources of the government
78
and the crowded dockets of the courts, before authorizing an appeal.” Mendoza thus seems to give a green light to the government to litigate the same is79
sue in different circuits so long as its opponent is different. But the government lawyer litigating an intercircuit nonacquiescence case must still tread
carefully.
80
Johnson v. United States Railroad Retirement Board is a case in point.
Johnson concerned the eligibility of the wife of a deceased railroad worker for
a spousal annuity. The Board, resolving a conflict between the Social Security
Act and the Railroad Retirement Act, held her ineligible as of the time her
youngest child turned sixteen, rather than eighteen. Two prior circuits had
disagreed with the Board’s interpretation by the time that the case reached us,
and we, likewise, ruled for the wife, noting that the Board had sought neither
certiorari in either of the two prior decisions nor congressional clarification.
We admonished the Board to change its nonacquiescence policy—which we,
agreeing with a dissenting Board member, called “grossly unjust” and “a bold
challenge to judicial authority,” noting that it raised “serious statutory and con81
82
stitutional questions” —in light of the three reversals.
76. 464 U.S. 154 (1984).
77. Id. at 16263.
78. Id. at 161.
79. The Court in Mendoza emphasized the usefulness of intercircuit dialogue before the Supreme
Court decided a case, both as an indicator of the seriousness of the issue and as a source for refining its
own rationale. It also mentioned the danger of “freezing” the first decision against an agency. Id. at
160.
80. 969 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
81. Id. at 1084, 1090, 1091.
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In these types of cases, counsel in all probability has not determined agency
policy, but he often bears the brunt in trying to defend it, a point courts would
do well to keep in mind.
3. Consistency Within the Government Itself. Government, of course, is not
a monolith. Different agencies have different missions and different degrees of
accountability to the President and to congressional mandates. DOJ has
labored long and not always successfully for centralization in the government’s
litigation and has issued Memoranda of Understanding to provide for
consultation, negotiation, and occasionally co-counselship with agency lawyers
in presenting appeals in court. But independent agencies, and even some
departments, eager to control their own destiny, appeal to Congress and the
83
courts for their own litigating authority, some successfully. The result is that,
on many occasions, two government lawyers will come to court on opposite
84
sides of a case, or the United States may take a position as amicus or
intervenor that is inconsistent with that maintained by an agency party. In
these cases, the court feels more at liberty to decide on its own where right and
justice lie. Deference is diffused, and the job of the government’s counsel—
both of them—is made proportionately more difficult.
Our court is by now inured to cases in which the government is a house divided. Some statutory schemes are structured so as to make intragovernmental
85
disputes inevitable. We have for many years adjudicated disputes between the
Independent Counsel and parts of the executive over subpoenaed material and
86
privileges, and Congress itself, through bodies such as the Office of Senate
87
Legal Counsel, may appear on the opposite side of a case from the executive.
In such cases, the government lawyer cannot expect quite the deference he gets
when he represents a unified United States; in most instances, judges can be
expected to depend more on their own independent grasp of the case than on
any presumption in favor of either part of the government’s interpretation.

82. The Federal Agency Compliance Bill, supra note 74, also requires DOJ and agency officials to
ensure that federal litigation is initiated, defended, or continued so as to avoid unnecessarily repetitive
litigation when three or more judicial circuits have resolved an issue against the government’s litigating position.
83. See, e.g., Mail Order Ass’n of America v. United States Postal Serv., 986 F.2d 509 (D.C. Cir.
1993) (denying DOJ’s challenge to U.S. Postal Service’s attempt to represent itself in appeal of Postal
Rate Commission order).
84. See Devins, supra note 58, at 313 (“Independent agencies and the Department of Justice often
air intragovernmental conflicts before lower federal courts of appeals.”); id. at 315-16 (citing cases).
The Supreme Court has recognized that such intragovernmental disputes may prevent a cognizable
case or controversy. See, e.g., United States v. ICC, 337 U.S. 426 (1949) (involving DOJ challenge to
ICC’s rejection of U.S. Army complaint against unreasonable railroad rates).
85. See, e.g., Martin v. OSHRC, 499 U.S. 144 (1991) (reviewing court must defer to Secretary, not
OSHRC, in interpretation of ambiguous Department of Labor regulation in “split enforcement” statutory scheme for health or safety regulations).
86. See, e.g., In re Bruce R. Lindsey (Grand Jury Testimony), 148 F.3d 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1998); In re
Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073 (D.C. Cir. 1998); In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
87. See 2 U.S.C. § 288 (1994).
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IV
CONCLUSION
While it is a proud boast of our judicial system that the government gets no
better break in court than private counsel, there are, realistically, differences
between the two. Judges, especially in specialized courts such as the D.C. Circuit, get to know government lawyers (as repeat players) better and to expect
more of them by way of competence, candor, civility, credibility, and consistency. The result is often that judges come down harder on government lawyers when they deviate from professional norms or even the special norms
judges have constructed for them. Strong advocacy by government lawyers of
their agency clients is to be desired, but most judges want the government lawyer to consider the “public interest,” ephemeral as that is, to be his phantom
client as well.
Government lawyers are fortunate, in many respects: They argue cases of
enormous importance with implications for a citizenry constituency far beyond
the opposing party in the immediate case. For that privilege, they can anticipate being endlessly probed and queried about consistency in government enforcement and the real-world consequences of doctrinal theories and arguments. By and large that is as it should be.
The knotty problem of agency nonacquiescence continues to mar the judgegovernment lawyer relationship and needs to be focused upon in a nonpartisan
way apart from the “crisis of the moment.” Otherwise, government lawyers
must be reconciled to being held to a largely indefinable “higher standard” of
conduct in the courtroom. (I have tried to give it some content but have no illusions that there are not hundreds of other variations on the theme.) Withal, I
would be surprised if many government lawyers would trade places with their
private counterparts—assuming economic factors are out of the picture and
their legal philosophies are compatible with those of the administration in
power. When the government lawyer rises to speak “for the United States,”
that is its own reward.

